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Over eight decades have elapsed since Roscoe Pound delivered
an iconoclastic address entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatis-
faction with the Administration of Justice"' to the twenty-ninth
annual meeting of the American Bar Association. A conspicuous
deficiency of our adversary system of adjudication, according to
Pound, derives from its inordinate emphasis on procedure to the
detriment of substantive justice.2 This stress on procedure results
in an adjudicatory process that resembles a game in which the pri-
mary objective is to ensure scrupulous adherence to procedural
rules rather than to achieve substantive justice. The outcome of
such a process, Pound maintained, is that our system of adversary
adjudication transforms the law into a "mere game"; as Pound elo-
quently put it, "[Our] sporting theory of justice awards new trials,
or reverses judgments, or sustains demurrers in the interest of reg-
ular play." 3
The theme Pound elaborated in that momentous address has
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.A. Jacksonville
University; M.A. University of Florida; J.D. University of Florida. Professor Garcia formerly
served as Assistant State Attorney, Narcotics Division in Miami, Florida. He would like to
thank Mike Bloom, for his generous research assistance. "The author is also indebted to his
colleague, Ellen Podgor, for her assistance and helpful comments on earlier drafts."
1. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
2. Id. at 404-06.
3. Id. at 406.
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been echoed by legal scholars, particularly in the context of our
criminal justice system." Indeed, the resiliency of Pound's message,
which centered on the deleterious effects of our adversary system
of adjudication,5 is evidenced by the spate of legal commentary on
the relative merits or disadvantages of the adversary process.6
The debate over the effectiveness of the adversary system as a
mechanism for arriving at the truth has gained considerable atten-
tion in the context of our criminal justice process. 7 A salient fea-
ture of that controversy focuses on whether procedural protections
accorded to criminal defendants impede the "search for truth" by
excluding probative, relevant evidence.8 The centerpiece of this
4. It should be pointed out that Pound limited his comments to the civil area, specifi-
cally excluding the criminal realm, because he thought the civil arena more worthy of con-
cern. Id. at 396. For three examples of the application of Pound's theory to the criminal
process, see Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1440-43 (1985) (arguing
that the sporting theory gives the defendant an undue advantage); Grano, Miranda v. Ari-
zona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 243, 267 (1986) (sporting theory as applied in Miranda leads to unwarranted formal-
ism to the detriment of justice); Grano, Implementing the Objectives of Procedural Reform:
The Proposed Michigan Rules of Criminal Procedure- Part I, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1007, 1019-
22 (1986) (attacking the sporting theory of justice in the criminal context).
5. Pound explained that the adversary process undermined public confidence in the
legal system by fostering the skewed notion that procedure was a means toward evasion of
substantive justice. He noted that, "The effect of our contentious procedure is not only to
irritate parties, witnesses and jurors in parrticular cases, but to give the whole community a
false notion of the purpose and end of law. Hence comes, in large measure, the modern
American race to beat the law. If the law is a mere game, neither the players who take part
in it nor the public who witness it can be expected to yield to its spirit when their interests
are served by evading it." Pound, supra note 1, at 406.
6. See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.; Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1984); Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L.
REV. 647 (1986); Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the
Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 799.; Sward, Values, Ideology, and the
Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L. J. 301 (1986); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE
(1977); M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION
AND DEFENSE (1984).
7. Compare, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 6 at 651 (arguing that "The American adver-
sary system is misdescribed as a search for truth"); with Steffen, supra, note 6 at 803 (con-
tending that "truth should be the reigning objective of every trial"). The specific application
of the adversary system to the criminal sphere has multiple facets; that is, a criminal trial
allegedly serves the varied objectives of finding the truth, producing a fair decision, protect-
ing the defendant from possible governmental abuse, and generating norms accepted by the
public. These goals are not mutually exclusive; rather, they shade into one another. See
Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 118, 121-44 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind, supra note 4, at 276
("Under the dictates of Miranda's black letter formalism, we have thus reached a point in
our jurisprudence that judges feel constrained to suppress reliable statements even though
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controversy, of course, is the exclusionary rule, which affords crim-
inal defendants the benefit of the suppression of otherwise rele-
vant, material evidence as a remedy for the violation of protections
delineated in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.'
The rationale supporting the exclusionary remedy is grounded
upon three fundamental tenets: the interest in individual dignity,
the requirement of judicial integrity and the need to curb official
power. 10 Although the primary function of the exclusionary remedy
is to deter police misconduct, the ancillary purposes of the preser-
vation of judicial integrity and of individual dignity are equally
compelling bases for the rule. The Supreme Court, however, has
completely discarded these rationales, maintaining that the sole
object of the rule is the deterrence of official misconduct.1' Fur-
thermore, the Court has held that the rule is not mandated by the
Constitution, arguing that it is merely a "judicially created rem-
edy" designed to achieve a deterrent effect instead of being a per-
sonal constitutional right of the party whose rights are violated. 2
Within the past decade and a half, the Court has significantly
narrowed the scope of the rule by employing a balancing approach
which weighs the costs of excluding material evidence against the
they acknowledge that the Miranda warnings in the particular context would be counter-
productive in terms of everyone's interest and even though the statements obtained have
not been compelled. ... ). But see, Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles
from the Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
669 (1987) (the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has resulted
in the diminution of rights afforded defendants pursuant to that amendment).
9. The rule was initially applied by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal
case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961), the Court made the application of the rule a constitutional requirement. The rule
was invoked for a fourth amendment violation in Mapp. It was also applied with respect to
the Fifth Amendment initially in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars the use of involuntary confessions in
federal court) and also in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court held
that any inculpatory or exculpatory statements in response to police questioning made by a
defendant in custody without the appropriate Miranda warnings and a proper waiver of the
Miranda rights is inadmissible. Id. at 444-45. The Court has also applied the rule with re-
gard to the sixth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-39 (1967)
(excluding identification by witness because post-indictment lineup conducted without
counsel in violation of the sixth amendment); and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
206-07 (1964) (excluding statements deliberately elicited by government agent after the de-
fendant had been indicted and secured counsel).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 659 (1961).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984).
12. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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benefits derived from the application of the exclusionary remedy."3
Given the Court's restrictive interpretation of the purposes served
by the exclusionary rule, such a balancing test tips the scale in a
manner that clearly favors the admission of evidence gathered in
violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. A corol-
lary of this perspective is that it supposedly furthers "the public
interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them ac-
quitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes
the truth.""' Of course, such a view rests on the cornerstone of
Pound's critique of the "sporting theory" of justice: that is, that
the adjudicatory process should determine the outcome of a con-
troversy on the substantive merits rather than on the slavish en-
forcement of procedural rules.
It is evident, therefore, that the exclusionary rule has come
under increasing negative scrutiny by the Court in recent years in
large part due to its "costs": that is, the rule excludes probative,
relevant, evidence. In Taylor v. Illinois,6 however, the Court ex-
cluded probative, material evidence offered by a defendant in a
criminal trial."6 Paradoxically, the Taylor decision relies heavily on
the integrity rationale, previously jettisoned by the Court as a ba-
sis for the exclusionary, rule, to support the exclusion of relevant,
probative evidence.17 The decision, moreover, portends an ominous
abridgment of a defendant's right to present a defense by adminis-
tering the exclusionary remedy, previously applied only to vindi-
cate an aggrieved defendant's constitutional rights, to prevent a
criminal defendant from offering exculpatory evidence.
In effect, the Taylor Court elevated procedure over substance,
thereby succumbing to'the "sporting theory" of justice. This Arti-
cle argues that the Taylor decision reflects a result-oriented juris-
prudence that decisively alters the balance of power in a criminal
trial by denying a defendant the right to present critical evidence.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), crafting a "good-faith" excep-
tion to the rule for evidence obtained by police officers relying on a search warrant later
determined to be lacking probable cause. The Court's reasoning was that the exclusionary
rule would not deter police misconduct under such circumstances. Id. at 920-21.
14. In holding that constitutional rights are personal and that the exclusionary rule is
not applicable to a party whose rights are not violated by public officials, the Court noted in
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), that: [W]e are not convinced that the addi-
tional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Id. at 174-75.
15. 108 S.Ct. 646, reh'g denied 108 S.Ct 1283 (1988).
16. Id. at 655-56.
17. Id. at 656.
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The decision, moreover, is inconsistent with our adversary system
of adjudication and runs counter to precedent. Further, Taylor
flies in the face of the Court's previous derogation of reliability and
integrity as attributes worthy of constitutional concern.
18
The Taylor decision is grounded upon a strained construction of
the sixth amendment's Compulsory Process Clause.19 Therefore,
Part II of this Article delves into the historical background and
modern doctrinal basis of the clause. Part III will undertake a de-
tailed critique and analysis of Taylor, emphasizing its departure
from precedent and its logically flawed analysis. In turn, Part IV
will juxtapose Taylor's premises with the Court's recent devalua-
tion of the twin goals of integrity and reliability as values meriting
constitutional protection.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MODERN BASIS
OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
A. The Emergence of Compulsory Process
As the architect of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, James Madison included within its parameters the
right of the criminal defendant to obtain compulsory process of
witnesses in his favor.2" In comparison with other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the sixth amendment was passed without major
modifications and with little controversy. 1 It is also apparent that
the provision of the sixth amendment. relating to compulsory pro-
cess had gained wide acceptance at an early date in our history. As
the foremost authority on the Compulsory Process Clause persua-
sively demonstrates, by 1791 the right of compulsory process was
firmly entrenched within the American criminal process and "rep-
resented the culmination of the long-evolving principle that the
18. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986), the Court did not object to the
admission of a presumptively unreliable confession. See part IV, infra. For a critique and
analysis of Connelly, see Garcia, Mental Sanity and Confessions: The Supreme Court's
New Version of the Old "Voluntariness" Standard, 21 AKRON L. REv. 275 (1988).
19. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[iln all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Madison drafted all of the provisions incorporated in the sixth amendment with
the exception of the part dealing with trial in the state and district where the crime was
committed. See, e.g., Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 76, n. 7
(1974) (citing J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 430-31,
437-38, 442-43, 449, 455 (1971)); F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (1951).
21. See Westen, supra note 20, at 77; Heller, supra note 20, at 30-34.
1990
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defendant should have a meaningful opportunity, at least on a par
with the prosecution, to present a case in his favor through
witnesses."22
The vitality of the clause, moreover, was made clear in its force-
ful application less than two decades after the passage of the Bill
of Rights in the misdemeanor and treason trials of former Vice
President Aaron Burr. 23 A harbinger of the Burr decisions had
been provided by Justice Chase in United States v. Cooper.24 In
that case, the defendant was on trial for libeling the President and
he requested that the court issue a letter to members of Congress
imploring their attendance as witnesses on his behalf. Chase sum-
marily denied the defendant's request, explaining that the defend-
ant could rely on the Compulsory Process Clause. The clause, he
believed, applied to members of Congress, thus rendering superflu-
ous the issuance of the letter since members of Congress could be
ordered to appear at trial.
Similarly, Justice Marshall concluded in the Burr cases that the
clause must be implemented even when the President of the
United States is the subject of its reach. 6 Marshall enshrined the
clause by asserting that "[T]he right given by this article must be
deemed sacred by courts, and the article should be so construed as
to be something more than a dead letter. ' 26 In placing such a high
value on the protections afforded by the right to compulsory pro-
cess, Marshall rejected President Jefferson's interest in secrecy. Al-
though recognizing the President's need for secrecy, Marshall re-
marked that such an interest must give way to the defendant's
need for information "absolutely necessary in [his] defense. '27 Of
22. Westen, supra note 20, at 78, 79-101.
23. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 27 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 18.07).
24. 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 341 (Cir. Ct., D. Pa., 1800). Justice Chase, of course, was "riding
circuit" when he decided this case.
25. The compulsory process Burr sought revolved around two crucial letters that
formed the heart of the case against him. The letters allegedly exposed Burr's plot to create
a separate country under his control by invading Mexico and dissolving the states west of
the Alleghenies. These letters were allegedly in President Jefferson's possession, since he
had used them to inform Congress of Burr's plot and to establish Burr's supposed guilt in
the matter. As a result of Jefferson's message, Burr was arrested and bound over to a grand
jury in Richmond, Virginia. See Westen, supra note 20, at 102-03.
26. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33.
27. Marshall noted that: "Perhaps the court ought to consider the reasons which
would induce the president to refuse to exhibit such a letter as conclusive on [the privilege],
unless such letter could be shown to be absolutely necessary in the defense. . .But on ob-
jections being made by the president to the production of a paper, the court would not
proceed further in the case without such an affivadit as would clearly shew the paper to be
Vol. 28:619
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course, the claim of executive privilege would be pitted against the
demands of compulsory process over a century and a half later in
United States v. Nixon.
28
B. The Modern Doctrinal Basis of Compulsory Process
Despite the forceful manner in which Marshall construed the
Compulsory Process Clause in the Burr case, the clause lay dor-
mant for a considerable period of time, 9 until the Supreme Court
resurrected it in the landmark case of Washington v. Texas.30 In
light of the significance of the decision, and the Taylor Court's
flawed and incomplete application of Washington's doctrinal im-
peratives, it is worthwhile to examine in detail that seminal
decision.
The Washington Court gave new impetus to the right to com-
pulsory process by equating it with the right to present a defense
and by characterizing compulsory process as a "fundamental ele-
ment of due process of law."' 31 The Court thereby invalidated two
Texas statutes that prohibited persons charged or convicted as
coparticipants in the same crime from testifying for one another,
although the same restriction was not applicable to the prosecu-
tion.3 2 The factual predicate of Washington, therefore, must be ex-
amined in order to derive the doctrinal essence of the decision.
Jackie Washington was charged and convicted by a jury of mur-
der. His defense rested on the contention that he did not shoot the
victim, but that he unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade the code-
fendant, Fuller, from shooting the victim. 33 The record clearly indi-
cated that the codefendant would have been willing to testify at
Washington's trial and would have corroborated Washington's tes-
timony. However, since Fuller had been previously convicted of the
murder, the Texas statutes precluded him from testifying on
essential to the ...case." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 192.
28. 418 U.S. 683, 709-13 (1974). See infra Part II B for a discussion of Nixon.
29. As Professor Westen notes, until 1967, the Supreme Court dealt with the clause on
five occasions, twice in dictum and three times in refusing to construe it. Westen, supra note
20, at 108. Those five cases were: Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.1 (1966); Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932); United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173
(1891); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361,
363-65) (1851), overruled in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918). Id. n.164.
30. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 22-23.




The Court first determined that the Compulsory Process Clause
was applicable to the states through the operation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.35 In arriving at this con-
clusion, the Court revitalized the right to compulsory process by
placing it on an equal footing with such other Sixth Amendment
guarantees as the right to confrontation, the assistance of counsel,
and the right to a speedy and public trial.36 In strong terms, the
Court defined the clause as implicating, "[tihe right to offer the
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance . . .[and]
the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as
the prosecution's to the jury so that it may decide where the truth
lies.""7
The rationale undergirding the Washington decision is based on
the principle that our adversary system of adjudication values the
introduction of relevant, probative evidence over a court's "interest
in preventing perjury."38 In rejecting the reasoning behind the
Texas rule, namely that if alleged accomplices to a crime were per-
mitted to testify for one another, "each would try to swear each
other out of the charge,"3 " the Court instead opted for a rationale
that placed trust on jurors to weigh the credibility of relevant tes-
timony. Indeed, the Washington Court believed that if truth were
one of the fundamental goals of the adversary system, it was
"[m]ore likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all per-
sons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowl-
edge of the facts involved in such a case, leaving the credit and
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the
court.
'40
Given the Washington Court's emphasis on the need to present
relevant, crucial evidence to a jury, despite the risk that such testi-
mony might be tainted, it was natural that the Court would find
the violation of Jackie Washington's right to compulsory process.
As the Court cogently put it:
34. Id. at 16-17.
35. Id. at 17-19.
36. Id. at 18.
37. Id. at 19.
38. Id. at 21-22.
39. Id. at 21 (quoting Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892)).
40. Id. at 22. The Court quoted from Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
The Court also noted that even though Rosen was not constitutionally based, its logic was
required by the Sixth Amendment. Id.
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We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbi-
trarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physi-
cally and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally
observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to
his defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the
futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of wit-
nesses whose testimony he had no right to use."
Implicit in the majority opinion is the notion that the defendant
ought to have an equal opportunity to present her version of
events, given the prosecution's inherent power to present its case.
To the degree that arbitrary rules designed to prevent perjury
forestall crucial witnesses from testifying for the defendant, the
ends of justice are not served. In essence, the Washington Court
nullified the Texas rules that prevented Fuller from testifying on
Washington's behalf by classifying them as arbitrary because'they
"[p]revent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on
the basis of a priori categories that presume them worthy of unbe-
lief."42 Indeed, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion was premised
not on the Compulsory Process Clause but rather on the notion
that fairness dictated that the defense ought to have the same op-
portunity as the prosecution for presenting a coparticipant's cru-
cial testimony.4
The principal teaching of Washington is that testimony on a
critical issue must be presented to the trier of fact even if the pos-
sibility exists that such testimony might be perjured." A by-
41. Id. at 23. The Court qualified its holding by asserting in a footnote that "Nothing
in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges. . . which are
based on entirely different considerations from those underlying the common law disqualifi-
cations for interest. Nor do we deal in this case with nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify
as witnesses persons who, because of mental infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing
events or testifying about them." Id. n. 21.
42. Id. at 22. The Court correctly observed that the testimony of an accomplice who
testified for the prosecution had a greater likelihood of being perjured, since such an accom-
plice obviously had a tremendous inducement to lie. Id. Moreover, the majority exposed the
faulty logic of the statutes by stating that: "To think that criminals will lie to save their
fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe the
criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in the public at large." Id. at
22-23.
43. Id. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 21. In rejecting the justification for the Texas statutes disqualifying copar-
ticipants of a crime from testifying for each other, the Court remarked that such rules
"[r]ested on the unstated premises that the right to present witnesses was subordinate to
the court's interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were best avoided by
preventing the jury from hearing any testimony that might be perjured, even if it were the
only testimony available on a crucial issue." Id.
1990 627
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product of this precept is that the finder of fact ought to be
trusted with the decision of ferreting out the relative weight and
credibility of testimony that is relevant and probative rather than
being shielded from such testimony because it might be tainted.
The Washington Court, in fact, quoted approvingly from Benson
v. United States45 for the proposition that the common law notion
that only disinterested parties should be allowed to testify ought to
be rejected. The reason for this common law rigid rule was that,
"[tihe courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors." '46 In
effect, the Washington Court imade the clear choice that the pres-
entation of crucial evidence in, a criminal trial superseded a court's
interest in precluding a jury from hearing testimony that might be
perjured.
The main teaching of Washington was foreshadowed in Hoffa v.
United States. 7 In Hoffa, however, the principle was applied to
the prosecution rather than to the defendant. Hoffa's conviction
hinged on the testimony of a government informer whose credibil-
ity was subject to question. The defendant thus contended that the
prosecution's use of such an informer, who had a great motive to
lie, violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.48 The
Court agreed with Hoffa's argument that the informer had a great
incentive to lie.49 Nevertheless, it rejected Hoffa's Due Process ar-
gument because the testimony of the informant was not ipso facto
untrue and because the built-in safeguards of the adversarial sys-
tem, namely cross-examination and the ability of the jury to assess
the weight and credibility of the testimony, counterbalanced the
probability that the informers' testimony was perjured."
45. 146 U.S. 325 (1892).
46. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 21 (quoting from Benson v. United States, 146
U.S. at 336).
47. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
48. Id. at 310-11.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id. at 311-12. It should be pointed out that the trial judge in Hoffa instructed the
jury on weighing the informer's testimony. The judge gave the following intruction to the
jury:
You should carefully scrutinize the testimony given and the circumstances under
which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence which tends to indicate
whether the witness is worthy of belief. Consider each witness' intelligence, his mo-
tives, state of mind, his demeanor and manner while on the witness stand. Consider
also any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case. . . .All evidence of
a witness whose self-interest is shown from either benefits received, detriments suf-
fered, threats or promises made, or any attitude of the witness which might tend to
prompt testimony either favorable or unfavorable to the accused should be consid-
ered with caution and weighed with care.
628 Vol. 28:619
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The results of both Washington and Hoffa are in accord with
our adversarial system of adjudication, which places responsibility
on the fact-finder to determine the truthfulness and credibility of
witnesses. 1 This burden is shouldered by the fact-finder, in most
criminal cases the jury, because the parties in an adversarial sys-
tem are primarily entrusted with the task of weakening their oppo-
nent's case through the impeachment of presumptively false or in-
consistent evidence. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has
asserted that cross-examination is the most effective means of ex-
posing false testimony.52 The risk of admitting testimony that
might be false, therefore, is outweighed by the benefit of permit-
ting the fact-finder to assess its weight and credibility assisted by
the inherent protections afforded by the adversarial system.
C. Application of Washington
The vigorous implementation of the right to compulsory process
in Washington continued unabated as the Court on several occa-
sions in the 1970s applied, either directly or tangentially, the prin-
cipal teachings of Washington. It is instructive, therefore, to ana-
lyze the decisions construing Washington. This examination is
necessary to counterpoise these decisions with the Court's misap-
plication of Washington in Taylor.
1. Cool v. United States
In a per curiam opinion, the Court in Cool v. United States53
held that a defendant was deprived of his right to compulsory pro-
cess when the trial court instructed the jury that the exculpatory
testimony of an accomplice should be disregarded unless the jury
deemed that such testimony was true beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
In applying Washington to the facts in Cool, the Court concluded
that such an instruction impermissibly infringed upon a criminal
defendant's right to compulsory process and violated Washington's
mandate because it excluded relevant evidence absent the jury's
Id. at 312 n.14.
51. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 440 (1976) (White, J., concurring);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359-
60 (1973); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 (1972); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311.
52. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965); Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-60.
53. 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
54. Id. at 104.
1990
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determination that the accomplice's testimony was "extremely
reliable.""
The Cool Court correctly construed Washington by emphasizing
the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence over the trial
court's interest in preventing a jury from reaching a verdict based
on testimony that might be "tainted.""6 The Court thereby
stressed the primary teaching of Washington that in a criminal
trial the defendant's right to present relevant exculpatory evidence
takes precedence over the trial court's interest in preventing the
jury from hearing testimony that might be perjured. Implicitly, the
Cool Court also implemented the precept enunciated in Washing-
ton that the fact-finder should determine the weight and credibil-
ity of possibly false testimony rather than being preempted from
considering such testimony by the trial judge or, alternatively, by
instructions issued by the court.
It is also natural to draw the inference from the Cool decision
that the Court viewed the impermissible jury instruction as con-
flicting with Washington's prohibition against assuming that some
witnesses' testimonies are not worthy of belief. To the extent that
the trial court's instructions in Cool clearly suggested to the jury
that the accomplice's testimony was not credible, the message con-
veyed to the jury was unmistakable: that is, accomplices fit the cat-
egory of witnesses who are a priori "suspect" and thus not
credible.
The second prong of the Cool decision relied on the fundamental
principle established by In re Winship57 that the prosecution must
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Through
its instruction on how to weigh the accomplice's testimony, the
trial court in essence "[created] an artificial barrier to the consid-
eration of relevant defense testimony putatively credible by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. . .[reducing] the level of proof neces-
55. Id. The trial judge issued the following instruction to the jury: "[I] charge you that
the testimony of an accomplice is competent evidence and it is for you to pass upon the
credibility thereof. If the testimony carries conviction and you are convinced it is true be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the jury should give it the same effect as you would to a witness
not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime and you are not only justified, but it is
your duty, not to throw this testimony out because it comes from a tainted source." Id. at
102 (emphasis added by the Court).
56. In effect, the trial court suggested to the jury that the accomplice's testimony was
not worthy of belief by stating in its instruction that the jury should not disregard the
testimony because it derived from a "tainted" source. Id. at 102.
57. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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sary for the Government to carry its burden."58 The upshot of the
trial judge's instruction was to require the defendant to prove his
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, since the defendant's case
relied almost exclusively on the accomplice's testimony.
59
2. Webb v. Texas
In a similar vein, the Court in Webb v. Texas 0 affirmed Wash-
ington's dictates, although it decided the case on Due Process
grounds rather than on the Compulsory Process Clause." In Webb
the defendant was prevented from presenting a witness when the
trial judge in effect intimidated the witness into not testifying. The
sole defense witness in Webb had a previous criminal record and
was serving a prison term when he was called by the defense.62 The
trial judge proceeded to issue a stern warning to the witness in
which he suggested that the witness could face perjury charges if
he testified for the defense." The witness did not testify, and the
defendant could not present a defense given the trial judge's suc-
cessful effort in dissuading the witness from testifying."
The Webb Court quoted approvingly from Washington65 in
holding that the defendant's Due Process rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment were violated by the judge's coercion of the de-
fense witness.6 6 Specifically, the Court affirmed the proposition es-
tablished by Washington that the defendant has a right to present
58. Cool, 409 U.S. at 104.
59. Id.
60. 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 98.
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id. at 96. The judge told the witness:
If you take the witness stand and lie under oath, the Court will personally see that
your case goes to the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury and the liklihood
[sic] is that you would get convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked onto
what you have already got, so that is the matter you have got to make up your mind
on. If you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years
and at least more time that you are going to have to serve. It will also be held against
you in the penitentiary when you're up for parole and the Court wants you to thor-
oughly 'understand the chances you're taking by getting on that witness stand under
oath. You may tell the truth and if you do, that is all right, but if you lie you can get
into real trouble. The court wants you to know that. You don't owe anybody anything
to testify and it must be done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough under-
standing that you know the hazards you are taking.
Id.
64. Id.




a defense coextensive with the prosecution's right to present its
case and that the jury serves the function of determining "where
the truth lies."
'6 7
3. Chambers v. Mississippi
In Chambers v. Mississippi,8 the Court again relied on the un-
derlying premises of Washington while deciding that the defend-
ant was denied Due Process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The defendant in that case was denied the right to present
the testimony of three witnesses who would have testified that
someone else committed the crime with which Chambers was
charged. 9 The trial court excluded this testimony on the basis that
it violated the hearsay rule.7" Noting that a defendant's right to
compulsory process is "essential to Due Process,' 71 the Chambers
Court reasoned that the right of the defendant to present wit-
nesses on his behalf, as set forth in Washington, Webb, and Oli-
ver,72 overrides the "mechanistic" application of the hearsay rule.
73
Although the Chambers majority acknowledged the need for evi-
dentiary rules that ensure fairness and reliability in the ascertain-
ment of guilt, the Court nonetheless rejected the procrustean ap-
plication of such rules to "defeat the ends of justice. ' 74 Chambers,
therefore, rejected the "sporting theory" of justice and instead fa-
vored a result grounded in substantive justice. In effect, the right
to present a defense triumphed over strict fealty to procedure.
4. United States v. Nixon
The apotheosis of the Compulsory Process Clause in the 1970s
occurred when the Court issued its decision in United States v.
Nixon.75 The Court harkened back to the basic postulate an-
67. Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).
68. 410 U.S. 284 (1972).
69. Id. at 292-93.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 294.
72. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
73. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
74. Id. The hearsay evidence in this case bore assurances of trustworthiness since it
was corroborated by other evidence in the case: to wit, the confession of Gabe McDonald,
who Chambers claimed committed the crime, the testimony of eyewitnesses to the shooting
(Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman), testimony establishing that McDon-
ald owned a revolver of the same caliber as the murder weapon, and testimony that McDon-
ald was seen with a gun at the scene of the crime. Id. at 300.
75. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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nounced by Chief Justice Marshall in the Burr cases 76 that the
Compulsory Process Clause takes precedence over claims of execu-
tive privilege. Underscoring the importance of compulsory process
to the attainment of a correct result in a criminal trial, the major-
ity noted that,"[t]o ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to
the function of the courts that compulsory process be available for
the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by
the defense."
77
More importantly, the Court stressed the constitutional aspect
of compulsory process,7 noting that implicit in the notion of a fair
trial was the "constitutional need" that the outcome be based upon
the weighing of all relevant evidence. 79 The claim of executive priv-
ilege, therefore, had to give way to the "specific need for evidence
in a criminal trial."80
If Nixon represents the culmination of the Court's expansive in-
terpretation of the Compulsory Process Clause, a series of cases
dealing with the tension between the demands imposed by discov-
ery rules and the right to compulsory process in the 1970s reflected
a certain ambivalence by the Court. Those cases did not resolve
the issue of whether discovery rules could, in certain instances,
take precedence over a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
compulsory process. A discussion and analysis of those cases will
be reserved and will constitute a backdrop to the discussion of
Taylor, since in that case the Court grappled with the question
posed by the conflict between discovery rules and the Compulsory
Process Clause.8'
D. The Countertrend of the 1980s
The fidelity to Washington's dictates manifested in the robust
application of its fundamental premises waned with the advent of
the 1980s and concluded with the Court's apathy and, indeed, an-
tipathy toward Washington in Taylor. The Court's decision in
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal2 heralded the attenuation of
the expansive application of the Compulsory Process Clause that
76. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
77. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.
78. Id. at 711. The Court affirmed that: "The right to the production of all evidence in
a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions."
79. Id. at 713.
80. Id. at 713.
81. See Part III A infra.
82. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
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had prevailed the previous decade.
In signaling its retreat from Washington, the Valenzuela-
Bernal Court held that when the government deports witnesses
who may possess evidence relevant to the defense, such a proce-
dure does not necessarily violate the Compulsory Process Clause
absent a showing that "[t]he evidence lost would be both material
and favorable to the defense."' 3 Moreover, the Court also evinced
its willingness to undertake a balancing approach in which govern-
mental administrative considerations would be weighed against the
defendant's right to compulsory process.84
In Valenzuela-Bernal, the defendant was charged with knowing
transportation of an illegal alien into the United States. 5 He was
arrested at a Border Patrol checkpoint with three other passengers
of the car he drove. 6 Two of those passengers were deported to
Mexico on the determination by an Assistant United States Attor-
ney that the passengers were not material witnesses either for the
prosecution or the defense.8 7 The defendant, who did not have an
opportunity to interview the two passengers before they were de-
ported, maintained that the deportation violated his right to com-
pulsory process pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and his right to
Due Process of law under the Fifth Amendment. 8
The reasoning adopted by the Valenzuela-Bernal Court was in
part based upon the administrative burdens shouldered by the
government as a result of not deporting aliens who "possess no ma-
terial evidence relevant to a criminal trial."89 Giving free rein to
prosecutorial discretion,90 the majority deemed that the prosecu-
tion could be entrusted with the task of deciding whether a witness
was material and relevant to the defense. 1 The Court thus dimin-
83. Id. at 872-73.
84. Id. at 864-65.
85. Id. at 860. Specifically, the defendant was indicted for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324
(a)(2), which prohibits the transportation of "any alien," "knowing that [the alien] is in the
United States in violation of law, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that
his last entry into the United States occurred less than three years prior" to the transporta-
tion or attempted transportation with which the person is charged. Id., n.1.
86. Id. at 861.
87. Id. A third passenger was detained to establish the defendant's violation of the
statute. Id.
88. Id. at 860-61.
89. Id. at 865.
90. The majority was concerned with restricting prosecutioral discretion to deport
aliens, noting that the "conceivable benefits" rule "significantly constrains the Govern-
ment's prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 865.
91. The Court rejected as overly broad the "conceivable benefits" rule embodied in
United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1, (9th Cir. 1971), which found a constitu-
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ished the value of the right to compulsory process by counterbal-
ancing the defendant's need for evidence with governmental, bu-
reaucratic considerations.
The primary rationale of Valenzuela-Bernal rests on the dubi-
ous proposition that the defendant can depend on the prosecution
to determine the materiality of the evidence; and that the defend-
ant bears the burden of proving, without any means of interview-
ing the witness, that the witness' testimony would have been mate-
rial and favorable to the defense.92
Furthermore, the majority in Valenzuela-Bernal misconstrued
the core meaning of Washington by relying on a crabbed reading
of the case. The Valenzuela-Bernal Court quoted Washington to
support its holding that the defendant had not established that the
testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material, rel-
evant, and vital to the defense.93 The majority noted that, "[i]n
Washington, this Court found a violation of the [Compulsory Pro-
cess] Clause of the Sixth Amendment when the defendant was ar-
bitrarily deprived of 'testimony [that] would have been relevant
and material, and . . .vital to the defense.' "I In essence, the
Valenzuela-Bernal Court not only quoted Washington out of con-
text, but it also clearly missed the holding and the underlying mes-
sage coveyed by Washington.
The clear holding of Washington is that the prosecution may not
arbitrarily deny a criminal defendant the right to "put on the
stand a witness who [is] physically and mentally capable of testify-
ing to events that he [has] personally observed, and whose testi-
mony [is] relevant and material to the defense."95 It is discernible
that the word "vital" is conspicuously missing from the Court's
holding. Although the testimony excluded from Washington's trial
was vital, the Court's holding was not circumscribed to the facts of
Washington's case, but rather stands for the broad principle that
the Compulsory Process Clause protects a criminal defendant's
right to present any relevant and material evidence.
In fact, the majority in Valenzuela-Bernal was acutely aware of
tional violation when "the alien's testimony could conceivably benefit the defendant."
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 862 (1982). The majority in Valenzuela-
Bernal added that the adoption of the "conceivable benefits" test unduly restricted
prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 865.
92. Id. at 867.
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting from Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 16 (1967)).
95. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
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the fact that Washington did not provide a firm basis for its hold-
ing. Consequently, the Court resorted to Roviaro v. United
States96 to bolster its rationale. In Roviaro, the Court held that the
government's interest in shielding an informant's identity must
yield to a criminal defendant's right to the informant's testi-
mony.9 7 Although the Roviaro Court's holding was not constitu-
tionally based, the Valenzuela-Bernal Court cited Roviaro for the
precept that "[wihile a defendant who has not had an opportunity
to interview a witness may face a difficult task in making a show-
ing of materiality, the task is not an impossible one.''98
As Justice Brennan aptly pointed out in dissent, the
Valenzuela-Bernal Court's reliance on Roviaro is also misplaced.9
Roviaro emphasized, according to Justice Brennan, the accused's
right to decide whether a witness might be helpful to the de-
fense. 100 Accordingly, the Court in Valenzuela-Bernal should have
allowed the defendant, not the prosecution, the option of deter-
mining whether the illegal-alien eyewitnesses could have furnished
testimony material and favorable to his defense.1'
The Valenzuela-Bernal decision underscored the Court's devia-
tion from the principles sustaining Washington. The ruling also
marked a disturbing trend in which governmental administrative
concerns are given equal, if not greater, weight than a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional rights.'02 In effect, the Valenzuela-Bernal
Court bowed to the "sporting theory" of justice by allowing admin-
istrative reasons to play a role in determining a criminal defend-
ant's right to present a defense. The ultimate glorification of the
"sporting theory" of justice and of procedure over substantive jus-
tice, however, occurred in Taylor v. Illinois.
03
96. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
97. Id. at 64-65. In Roviaro, the informer was the only witness, other than the de-
fendant, to the crime (a drug sale). Id.
98. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 871.
99. Id. at 883-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 884.
101. Id. at 884-85.
102. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). In that case, the Court placed
emphasis on administrative considerations (i.e., the efficiency of a joint trial for the smooth
operation of the criminal justice system) in denying a criminal defendant the right to con-
front her accuser (that is, her codefendant). See Garcia, The Winding Path of Bruton v.
United States: A Case of Doctrinal Inconsistency, 26 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 401, 420 (1988) for a
critique of Marsh.
103. 108 S.Ct. 646 (1988).
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III. TAYLOR V. ILLINOIS
In Taylor, the Court decided a question it had left unanswered
in both Williams v. Florida°4 and in Wardius v. Oregon 0 5 and on
which it had refused to grant certiorari on several prior occa-
sions:10 ' that is, whether the Compulsory Process Clause prohibits
the exclusion of admissible evidence as a sanction to enforce dis-
covery rules against criminal defendants. The Taylor Court an-
swered the question negatively, thereby championing the "sporting
theory" of justice and detracting from the ideal of a criminal trial:
to seek justice and truth based on all of the relevant, material evi-
dence available to the fact-finder. Moreover, the Court in Taylor
completely ignored the teachings of Washington and related
cases. ' 7 Before analyzing Taylor, however, it is necessary, as a
point of departure, to discuss its background.
A. Discovery and the Compulsory Process Clause
In Williams v. Florida,108 the Court came to grips with the issue
of whether Florida's pretrial discovery rule requiring the defend-
ant, in response to the prosecution's demand, to give notice of an
alibi defense. prior to trial was constitutional.'0 9 The Court held
that the rule was constitutional and hence not violative of the de-
fendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination be-
cause it did not compel him to reveal any information but merely
accelerated the timing of his disclosure." 0 More important for our
purposes, however, is the Court's discussion of the relationship be-
tween discovery rules and the defendant's right to compulsory pro-
cess under the Sixth Amendment.
104. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
105. 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973).
106. See, e.g., Taliafero v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 (1983); United States ex rel. Robin-
son v. McGinnis, 593 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. 11. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1078, cert. denied 471
U.S. 1116 (1985); Lane v. Enoch, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986); Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
107. See infra Section III C.
108. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
109. Id. at 79. Rule 1.200 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that the
defendant, before trial, must furnish, upon a written request by the prosecution, notice of
her intent to rely on an alibi and to provide the prosecution with information of the place
she claimed to have been and with the names and addresses of witnesses she intends to use
at trial. The rule also required the prosecution to disclose to the defense the names of wit-
nesses it intended to use to rebut the alibi. Id. at 80. The full text of the rule is published in
Williams, 399 U.S. at 104.
110. Id. at 85. The Williams Court also rejected the defendant's contention that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial mandates a twelve-person jury. Id. at 103.
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Noting that "the adversary system of trial is hardly an end in
itself," ' 1 the Court legitimized notice-of-alibi rules as consistent
with the search for truth and as congruent with the rational con-
cern of the prosecution to prevent "eleventh hour" defenses based
on false testimony. 2 The Court, however, qualified its holding by
stressing that Florida's notice-of-alibi rule was "carefully hedged





The Williams Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the
sanction imposed by the Florida notice-of-alibi rule because the
defendant complied with the rule. The sanction stipulated in the
rule involved the exclusion at trial of the defendant's alibi evi-
dence, with the exception of his own testimony." 4 In a footnote,
the Court unequivocally stated that it was not deciding whether
the prosecution could enforce discovery rules against the defend-
ant who failed to comply with such rules by excluding "probative,
relevant evidence."" 5
It is significant, moreover, that the Williams decision set forth
the appropriate solution to the problem notice-of-alibi rules are in-
tended to protect against: unfair surprise to the prosecution. In the
event that a jurisdiction lacked a notice-of-alibi provision similar
to Florida's statute, the adequate resolution to the prejudice suf-
fered by the prosecution is for the trial court to grant a continu-
ance as soon as the alibi witness is called."' The continuance
would negate the strategic advantage sought by the defense be-
cause the prosecution would then have an opportunity to take the
deposition of or interview the alibi witness and thus discover re-
buttal evidence.1 7 In fact, the Williams Court averred that such a
procedure would comport with the Constitution." 8 The Taylor
111. Id. at 82.
112. Id. at 81-82.
113. Id. at 81.
114. Id.at 80.
115. Id. at 83, n.14. The footnote, in its entirety, reads as follows:
We emphasize that this case does not involve the question of the validity of the
threatened sanction, had petitioner chosen not to comply with the notice-of-alibi rule.
Whether and to what extent a State can enforce discovery rules against a defendant
who fails to comply, by excluding relevant, probative evidence is a question raising
Sixth Amendment issues which we have no occasion to explore. Cf. Brief for Amicus
Curiae 17-26. It is enough that no such penalty was exacted here.
Id.
116. Id. at 85.
117. Id. at 86.
118. Id. at 85.
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Court, however, arbitrarily rejected this solution as a means of
remedying a discovery violation by the defense. 19
In contrast to the Court's approval of Florida's notice-of-alibi
rule, Oregon's alibi statute was found constitutionally deficient in
Wardius v. Oregon.120 The Court in Wardius held' that nonrecipro-
cal alibi rules violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 The defendant in Wardius was not permitted to
present an alibi defense at his trial either through a witness he
called or through his own testimony.'22
Once again, like the Williams Court, the Wardius Court de-
clined to rule on the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction as
applied to the defendant in a criminal trial. The defendant in
Wardius contended that the exclusion of his testimony or that of
other defense witnesses at trial would be unconstitutional, even
conceding the validity of Oregon's notice-of-alibi rule. The Court,
however, did not decide the issue, arguing that the matter was ren-
dered moot in light of the unconstitutionality of the Oregon
statute.
123
In an enlightening analysis of the purposes served by discovery
rules, the Wardius Court viewed such rules as helpful devices that
"by increasing the evidence available to both parties, [enhance] the
fairness of the adversary system."' 24 More important, the Court
grounded its decision on the essential premise that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a "balance of
forces" between the prosecution and the defense. 2 ' The majority
emphasized the importance of discovery for the defense as well as
for the prosecution.' Indeed, the majority in Wardius clearly inti-
119. See Part III C infra.
120. 412 U.S. 470 (1972).
121. Id. at 472.
122. Id. at 472-73. The defendant called one witness to establish an alibi. When the
witness testified, the prosecution moved to strike the testimony on the grounds that the
defendant had not filed a notice of alibi. The trial judge granted the prosecution's request.
The defendant then attempted to bring forth the alibi through his testimony, but the prose-
cution objected and the trial judge excluded the evidence. Id.
123.. Id. at 472, n.4. The full text of the footnote is as follows:
Petitioner also argues that even if Oregon's notice-of-alibi statute were valid, it could
not be enforced by excluding either his own testimony or the testimony of supporting
witnesses at trial. But in light of our holding that Oregon's rule is facially invalid, we
express no view as to whether a valid rule could be so enforced (citation omitted).
Id.
124. Id. at 474.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 475. The Court observed that discovery is a "two-way street"-and that
"[tihe State may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense wit-
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mated that discovery rules should favor the defense given the su-
perior advantages in resources the prosecution enjoys over the
defendant.127
In a trenchant concurring opinion, Justice Douglas elaborated on
the suggestion by the Wardius majority that discovery rules should
favor the defense. He assailed the development of discovery rules,
such as notice-of-alibi statutes, that compelled the defendant to
reveal information to the prosecution. The trial-related rights af-
forded criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights," 8 according to
Douglas, "[do] not envision an adversary proceeding between two
equal parties."129 Instead, those rights acknowledge the "awesome
power of indictment and the virtually limitless resources of govern-
ment investigators."' 30 In essence, the rights enjoyed by the de-
fendant under the United States Constution are "designed to re-
dress the advantage that inheres in a government prosecution." '
Although both the Williams and the Wardius decisions deferred
resolution of the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction as a
remedy for a defendant's violation of a discovery rule, they suggest
that the Court would have been loath to uphold such a drastic
measure. The Williams Court outlined the pragmatic solution to
the problem by approving a continuance for the prosecution to
nullify any strategic advantage the defendant sought to gain by
"ambushing" the prosecution. Similarly, it is possible to infer from
the Wardius decision that the Court would have been reluctant to
augment the prosecution's decisive advantage over the defendant
by excluding relevant, material defense witnesses from testifying.
The Court's affirmation of the defendant's right to present a de-
fense in Wardius was contrasted with the obligation of the defend-
ant to make available all of her evidence to the prosecution in
United States v. Nobles.1 32 Nobles presented the issue of whether
the defense had the right to offer a selective portion of certain
facts, thus thwarting the prosecution's right to cross-examination.
nesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses." Id.
127. Id. at 475, n.9.
128. The rights encompass the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Sixth Amendment rights to a trial by jury, to confront adverse witnesses, to Compulsory
Process for obtaining favorable evidence, to the assistance of counsel, and, of course, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI and XIV, §
I.
129. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973)(Douglas, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
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The defendant in that case attempted to question the credibility of
prosecution witnesses through the use of the testimony of his in-
vestigator, who had interviewed the witnesses.133 The trial court
did not allow the investigator to testify, however, because the de-
fense refused to disclose the written report of the investigator,
which summarized the interviews.
Upholding the trial court's exclusion of the investigator's testi-
mony, the Court determined that the defendant's right to compul-
sory process was not implicated in the case because, "[t]he District
Court did not bar the investigator's testimony. . . [i]t merely pre-
vented [defendant] from presenting to the jury a partial view of
the credibility issue. . . ."" The Court referred to the restriction
on the prosecution's opportunity to cross-examine the investigator
by remarking that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the
right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the
adversarial system.
13 5
The Nobles decision is crucial to our analysis because the major-
ity in Taylor patently misconstrued its import.1 3 The Nobles
Court did not impose the exclusionary sanction, as the previous
discussion demonstrates; rather, it merely prevented the defendant
from presenting a partial view of the testimony free from the con-
straints imposed by cross-examination. The majority in Taylor,
however, would employ Nobles for the proposition that the exclu-
sion of relevant, probative defense evidence is constitutionally per-
missible. 137 Such an application of Nobles is fundamentally
flawed.
138
B. Prelude to Taylor: Crane, Ritchie, and Rock
Although the Court in Nobles did not undermine the key ele-
ments. of Washington and its progeny, it did intimate in
Valenzuela-Bernal that it was willing to dilute the protections em:-
bodied in Washington to accommodate governmental interests.
139
Nevertheless, the Court gave no hint immediately before the Tay-
133. Id. at 227-29.
134. Id. at 241.
135. Id.
136. For the majority's misapplication of Nobles, see Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S.Ct. 646,
654 (1988).
137. Id.
138. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Taylor, 108 S.Ct. 646, 661-62 (1988)(Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
139. See supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
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lor decision that it was willing to decimate the doctrinal underpin-
nings of Washington to the degree it did in Taylor. In fact, the
three rulings bearing on the Compulsory Process Clause rendered
by the Court prior to 'Taylor strongly reasserted the basic rationale
underlying the defendant's right to compulsory process. It is in-
structive, therefore, to examine these three decisions as a basis of
comparison with the Taylor Court's distorted perspective of the
Compulsory Process Clause.
1. Crane v. Kentucky
In Crane v. Kentucky,"1 0 the Court held that a sixteen-year old
defendant was deprived of a fair trial when the trial court prohib-
ited the admission of testimony relating to the circumstances
under which his confession was given to the police.' 4 The Court
cited the Sixth Amendment guarantees of Compulsory Process and
Confrontation, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for the proposition that the Constitution entitles the
defendant to "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete de-
fense." '42 Since the government's case relied almost exclusively on
the defendant's confession,'"" a unanimous Court concluded that
the opportunity to present a defense would be hollow indeed if the
"[s]tate were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence
bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is
central to a defendant's claim of innocence."' 44
Not only did the Crane Court vigorously uphold the right of~a
criminal defendant to present a "complete" defense, but it also did
so when that right clashed with a state evidentiary rule. Though
the Court acknowledged the right of states to craft their eviden-
tiary and trial procedural rules, it also recognized that, given the
factual predicate of Crane, the exclusion of testimony regarding
the circumstances of the defendant's confession did not afford him
a fair trial.'45
140. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
141. Id. at 690.
142. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85
(1984).
143. Id. at 685. The defendant unsuccessfully attempted before trial to suppress the
confession. After the opening statement, during which defense counsel questioned the credi-
bility and reliability of the confession, the prosecution convinced the trial court to prevent
any testimony about the circumstances surrounding the confession. Id. at 684-86.
144. Id. at 690.
145. Id. at 689-90. The Court noted that, "[W]ithout signaling any diminution in the
respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of
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2. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
In the second case in which the Court had the opportunity of
addressing the scope of the Compulsory Process Clause, Pennsyl-
vania v. Ritchie,'" a majority expounded a restricted view of the
Compulsory Process Clause; in effect, the Ritchie Court equated
the Compulsory Process Clause with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus diminishing the status of the clause
established by Washington.'4 7 The Court expressed this narrow
conception of the right to compulsory process by declining to "de-
cide . . . whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Pro-




seems that the Ritchie Court conveniently ignored the fact that in
Washington the specific protections of the Compulsory Process
Clause were made applicable to the states through the operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 4"
Nevertheless, the Ritchie Court in dicta reasserted the basic pos-
tulates of the Compulsory Process Clause. Referring to the prece-
dent set forth in Washington, Chambers, Cool, and Webb, the
Court observed that criminal defendants have "the right to the
Government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable
witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that
might influence the determination of guilt.""'5 Furthermore, the
Court in Ritchie affirmed a criminal defendant's right to discover
material exculpatory evidence even though such evidence is
shielded by a state evidentiary privilege. In Ritchie, the defendant
was charged with the rape of his thirteen year old daughter 5 ' and
attempted to discover records about his daughter kept by a state
agency that investigated children mistreatment cases. 52 Invoking a
state statute,'53 the prosecutor convinced the trial judge that the
their own criminal trial rules and procedures, we have little trouble concluding on the facts
of this case that the blanket exclusion of the proferred testimony about the circumstances of
petitioner's confession deprived him of a fair trial." Id. at 690 (citing Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 404 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973)).
146. 480 U.S. 39 (1986).
147. Id. at 56.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
150. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1986).
151. Id. at 43.
152. Id.
153. A Pennsylvania statute provided that records of the Pennsylvania Children and
Youth Services were confidential subject to certain exceptions. One exception authorized
disclosure to a "court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." Id. at 44 n.2
(quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215 (a) (5) (Purdon Supp. 1986) ).
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records the defendant sought were privileged.' The Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enti-
tled defendant to a review of the file by the trial court to deter-
mine whether it contained "information that probably would have
changed the outcome of the trial." '5
3. Rock v. Arkansas
The ambiguity concerning the appropriate boundaries of the
Compulsory Process Clause evident in Ritchie was dispelled by the
Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas.'15 In Rock, the Court held
that an Arkansas evidentiary rule that per se excluded any testi-
mony that was hypnotically refreshed contravened a criminal de-
fendant's right to testify on her behalf.' 57 The Rock Court percep-
tively analyzed the issue it confronted as involving a dichotomy
between a state evidentiary rule designed to ensure reliabity in
fact-finding and the right of the defendant to present a defense by
offering material testimony.' 58
More importantly, the majority in Rock correctly interpreted the
major doctrinal underpinning of Washington: that evidentiary
rules based on the need for reliabity in the fact-finding process are
subservient to a criminal defendant's right to present a defense.15 9
In fact, the Court likened the statute at issue in Rock with the rule
of competence it declared unconstitutional in Washington.'6 0
Moreover, the Court quoted Chambers v. Mississippi for the prin-
ciple that a rule of evidence that prevents a criminal defendant
from presenting a complete defense by excluding material parts of
his testimony is constitutionally impermissible.'6 '
The Rock Court recognized that the "right [of a criminal defend-
ant] to present relevant evidence is not without limitation." '62
Nonetheless, the Court was careful to stress that restrictions on
154. Id.
155. Id. at 58.
156. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
157. Id. at 62.
158. Id. at 53. Citing Washington v. Texas, the majority noted that "[t]his is not the
first time this Court has faced a constitutional challenge to a state rule, designed to ensure
trustworthy evidence, that interfered with the ability of the defendant to offer testimony."
Id.
159. Id. at 53-55. It is significant that the Court quoted at length from Washington to
reaffirm this proposition.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 55.
162. Id.
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the defendant's right to testify must not "be arbitrary or dispro-
portionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." '168 Rather,
the Court proposed a delicate balancing approach in which the
burden rests with the state to justify an evidentiary rule that limits
a defendant's "constitutional right to testify.'
'164
Moreover, the Court in Rock allayed concerns about the reliabil-
ity of hypnotically refreshed testimony by pointing to the potent
weapon of cross-examination, which constitutes an "effective tool
for revealing inconsistencies.' 65 Therefore, the Court enunciated
the fundamental tenet expressed in Hoffa that cross-examination
in our adversary system of adjudication serves to bring to light the
truthfulness, or lack thereof, of a witness' testimony.' 6
Standing in stark contrast to the Rock Court's sound interpreta-
tion of the Compulsory Process Clause is the Court's egregious
misinterpretation of the clause as well as its disdainful indifference
to Washington's mandate in Taylor. The irony of the decision is
that the author of Rock, Justice Stevens, produced the diametri-
cally opposed opinion in Taylor.
C. Taylor v. Illinois
In Taylor, the Supreme Court allowed the preclusion of testi-
mony by a defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation
by the defense. 16 7 Unlike the situation in Washington, a rule of
competence did not disqualify the witness from testifying.1
6 8
Neither, for that matter, did a rule creating a privilege, such as the
rule in Roviaro protecting the identity of government informers,'6 9
nor the statute creating a privilege for certain juvenile records in
Ritchie,'70 pose an obstacle to the testimony the defendant sought
to present in Taylor. Rather, the testimony was excluded by the
trial court on the basis of a violation of a reciprocal discovery rule
which required the defendant, before trial, to reveal the names and
addresses of witnesses he intended to call.' 7 '
163. Id. at 55-56.
164. Id. at 56.
165. Id. at 61.
166. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
167. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
168. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
171. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649. The rule the defense violated is Illinois Sup.Ct. Rule
413(d), which provides in pertinent part that:
Subject to constitutional limitations and within a reasonable time after the filing of a
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Furthermore, unlike the notice-of-alibi statutes in Williams and
Wardius,7"2 whose primary goal was to prevent the likelihood of
fabricated testimony engendered by an alibi defense, the discovery
rule which the defense violated in Taylor was not chiefly designed
to prevent perjury through the means of an "eleventh hour" de-
fense. Therefore, the Taylor Court applied the exclusionary sanc-
tion to otherwise relevant, admissible evidence merely for the vio-
lation of a discovery rule.
Given the foregoing analysis, it is imperative to scrutinize the
reasoning of Taylor and to critique its faulty logic. A starting point
for such an exercise is the factual predicate of the decision. Follow-
ing an exposition of the facts, the Taylor decision will be analyzed
against the backdrop of the three fundamental premises of Wash-
ington v. Texas: that a defendant's right to present relevant, pro-
bative evidence outweighs a trial court's interest in preventing per-
jury; that, as a corollary to this principle, a jury ought to be
allowed to assess relevant testimony rather than being "protected"
from weighing the credibility of such testimony by exclusion of the
testimony; and that to the extent that evidentiary rules prevent
defense witnesses from testifying based on "a priori categories that
presume them worthy of unbelief," such rules violate the defend-
ant's right to compulsory process.
1 73
After undertaking an examination of Taylor from this vantage
point, the analysis will proceed to critique the part of the decision
that penalizes the defendant for the violations of discovery rules
committed by his defense counsel.174 Finally, the last section will
deal with the impact of Taylor on the criminal adversarial process:
that is, the extent to which Taylor affects the balance of power in
a criminal trial and contradicts the fundamental premises of the
criminal justice system.
written motion by the State, defense counsel shall inform the State of any defenses
which he intends to make at a hearing or trial and shall furnish the State with the
following material and information withing his possession or control:
(i) the names and last known addresses of persons he intends to call as witnesses
together with their relevant written or recorded statements, including memoranda
reporting or summarizing their oral statements, any record of prior criminal convic-
tions known to him. ..
Id. n.2 (emphasis added by the Court).
172. See supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
174. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 657.
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1. Facts
The defendant, Ray Taylor, was charged with and convicted (by
a jury) of the attempted murder of Jack Bridges.175 The conviction
rested on the testimony of Bridges, his brother and three other
witnesses. 76 These witnesses described an altercation that began
when Bridges slapped one Derrick Travis for sitting on Bridges'
car. Taylor came to the aid of Travis. 77 After a twenty-minute ar-
gument, Bridges left the scene "to cool off.' ' 78 Bridges apparently
did not "cool off" because he returned to the scene about an hour
later.'
9
Bridges testified at trial that when he returned to the scene with
his brother, Maurice Bethany, they were confronted by Taylor,
Travis, and several other individuals. Bridges testified that he fled,
but that Taylor pursued him and ultimately fired four shots at
Bridges, the last of which struck Bridges in the back. After he was
struck by the bullet, Bridges testified that Taylor pointed the gun
at his (Bridge's) head and pulled the trigger, but that the gun
misfired. 80
The altercation was supposedly Witnessed by twenty or thirty
bystanders. 8 Two of those eyewitnesses, Hattie and Regina Al-
good, who were sisters and friends of Taylor, testified for the de-
fense. "'82 Their version of the event in question differed from the
prosecution's account in one significant respect: they testified that
Bridges's brother, not Taylor, had a gun and fired into the group,
hitting his brother by mistake. 8 '
Before trial, the prosecutor filed a discovery motion pursuant-to
Illinois rules that requires the defense to disclose the names and
addresses of witnesses it intends to call at trial.8 This was in ac-
cordance with Illinois Practice Rules, which provide for reciprocal
discovery in all felony criminal cases.' 85 Part of that reciprocal dis-
covery includes a provision that requires the disclosure by both
sides, upon written motion by either the prosecution or defense, of
175. Id. at 649.
176. Id.




181. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
182. People v. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 491 N.E. 2d 3, 5 (1986).
183. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
184. Id. See supra note 171 to see a partial text of the rule.
185. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch ll0A, para. 411 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
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the names and addresses of all witnesses they intend to call at
trial.186
In the response to the prosecution's request, defense counsel in
Taylor provided the names of the two sisters who testified as well
as the names of two men who did not testify.187 He was permitted
to amend his answer on the first day of trial by adding the name of
two witnesses who did not testify. In fact, the only two witnesses
who testified for the defense at trial were the two sisters.1 88
The source of the controversy arose on the second day of trial.
After the prosecution's two main witnesses completed their testi-
mony, defense counsel sought to add the names of two witnesses to
his answer to discovery. One of those two witnesses was Alfred
Wormley, ls9 whose testimony the trial judge would ultimately ex-
clude.1 90 To justify his addition of the two witnesses, defense coun-
sel explained that "he had just been informed about them and that
they had probably seen the 'entire incident.',91
The trial judge questioned the late revelation of these two wit-
nesses. Defense counsel explained that the defendant had informed
him of these witnesses in advance of the trial but maintained that
he had been unable to locate Wormley. 192 The judge was not satis-
fied with defense counsel's explanation, stating that the witnesses's
names could have been ,furnished to the prosecution, even though
their addresses were unknown. At that particular point in the trial,
the trial court then told defense counsel to produce the two new
witnesses the next day, at which point he would decide whether
they would testify. Further, the trial judge made the statement
that "witnesses are being found that really weren't there. '1 93
186. Rule 412 obligates the State to disclose the names and addresses of its witnesses
upon written motion by the defense. Id. at para. 412 (a) (i). Rule 413 requires the defense to
reciprocate. Id. para. 413 (d) (i).
187. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 650.
191. Id. at 649.
192. Id. at 649-50.
193. Id. at 650. The judge told defense counsel:
There's all sorts of people on the scene, and all of these people should have been
disclosed before.
When you bring up these witnesses at the very last moment, there's always the
allegation and the thought process that witnesses are being found that really weren't
there. And it's a problem in these types of cases, and it should be-should have been
put on that sheet a long time ago.
At any rate, I'll worry about it tomorrow.
Id. n.6 (quoting appellate record at 13-14).
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The next day Wormley appeared in court, whereupon the trial
judge allowed defense counsel to make an offer of proof with
Wormley's testimony outside the jury's presence.19 Wormley testi-
fied that he had not witnessed the incident but that before the
altercation he saw Jack Bridges and his brother with two guns in a
blanket. Wormley also asserted that he heard Bridges and his
brother say "they were after Ray [Taylor] and the other people,"
and that prior to the incident he had run into Taylor and his group
and warned them "to watch out because they got weapons." '195
The prosecutor, on cross-examination, elicited from Wormley
that he first met the defendant (formally) two years after the inci-
dent occurred. He also admitted that defense counsel had visited
him at his home the week before the trial began. 196 At the end of
Wormley's testimony, the trial judge excluded Wormley's testi-
mony as a sanction for the discovery violation.1 97
The trial judge's justification for excluding Wormley's testimony
is instructive because it strikes at the core of the Compulsory Pro-
cess Clause and, specifically, at the precedent established by
Washington. The trial judge's reasons for excluding the testimony
were threefold: as a sanction for a "blatant" and "willful" violation
of discovery rules; to deter future violations of discovery rules be-
cause of previous discovery violations by other defense attorneys in
his courtroom; and because he seriously questioned the credibility
of Alfred Wormley.198
It is also worthwhile to note that the trial judge chose to impose
the most drastic remedy for noncompliance provided by the Illi-
194. Id. The appellate record does not account for the fact that the second witness,




198. Id. The judge's comments are reproduced in the Supreme Court's opinion. They
read as follows:
THE COURT: All right, I am going to deny Wormley an opportunity to testify
here. He is not going to testify. I find this is a blatant violation of the discovery rules,
(sic)willful violation of the rules. I also feel that defense attorneys have been violating
discovery in this courtroom in the last three or four cases blatantly and I am going to
put a stop to it and this is one way to do so.
Further, for whatever value it is, because this is a jury trial, I have a great deal of
doubt in my mind as to the veracity of this young man that testified as to whether he
was an eyewitness on the scene, sees guns that are wrapped up. He doesn't know Ray
but stops Ray.




nois discovery rules. 199 Illinois Practice Rule 415 stipulates the
penalties a trial judge may impose for violation of reciprocal dis-
covery: the judge may order the noncomplying party to disclose the
withheld information; she may grant a continuance; she may ex-
clude the undisclosed evidence; and finally, the trial judge may
enter whatever order she deems "just under the circumstances. "'20
The conclusion one may draw from a full reading of the remedies
provided by the rule is that exclusion is reserved for cases in which
the evidence remains "undisclosed." In the Taylor case, however,
the evidence was disclosed: Wormley was produced and testified
subject to cross-examination, though admittedly he was produced
late in the trial.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Taylor's conviction,2"'
holding that exclusion of evidence was a permissible sanction for
the violation of discovery rules and leaving to the unfettered dis-
cretion of the trial judge the severity of the sanction imposed. The
court thus reasoned that the trial court in Taylor "was within its
discretion in refusing to allow the additional witnesses to tes-
tify."202 After the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Taylor's appeal,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 0 3
2. Reliability and Integrity vs. Compulsory Process
It utterly defies reason that the majority in Taylor20 4 only refers
to Washington v. Texas once in the main body of the opinion.0 5
The answer to the Taylor Court's glaring lack of reliance on Wash-
199. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
200. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. ll0A, para. 415 (g) (i) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
201. 141 Il.App.3d 839, 491 N.E.2d 3 (1986).
202. Id. at 844-45, 491 N.E.2d at 7.
203. 479 U.S. 1063 (1987).
204. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opin-
ion and was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. At the time Taylor was decided,
Justice's Powell replacement on the Court had not been confirmed.
205. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 652. The Court employs Washington to establish the pro-
position that the Compulsory Process Clause embraces the right to offer testimony and not
merely the empty right to subpoena witnesses. The Court therefore rejected the State of
Illinois' contention that the Compulsory Process Clause merely guarantees the right of the
defendant to subpoena witnesses. Id. at 651.The other references to Washington in the ma-
jority opinion are contained in footnote 1, in which Washington is cited for the proposition
that the Compulsory Process Clause is applicable to the states. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649 n.1;
and in footnote 9 to resolve the issue of whether Taylor had preserved a constitutional issue
at the trial level because he only invoked a Due Process violation though he relied on Wash-
ington and Chambers to support his position. The Court concluded that such reliance on
the sixth amendment was "clear." Id. at 651 n.9.
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ington, however, is transparently evident. The Court did not em-
phasize Washington because it blithely ignored the basic postu-
lates of the decision. In fact, the Taylor Court conveniently missed
the primary lesson of Washington: that the defendant's right to
present exculpatory evidence outweighs the court's interest in
preventing perjured or otherwise potentially unreliable testimony.
The rationale of the Taylor decision is predicated upon a bal-
ancing perspective that weighs the "fundamental" right of the de-
fendant "to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor" against
"countervailing public interests."206 Those competing "interests"
are the integrity of the adversary system, which depends on the
admissibility of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable ev-
idence; the need for the "fair" and "efficient" administration of
justice; and the axiom that the ascertainment of truth is the ulti-
mate objective of a trial.20 '
The linchpin of the Taylor decision is the Court's concern with
the values of reliability and integrity as indispensable to the opera-
tion of the criminal justice system. The Court rejected Taylor's
contention that the exclusion sanction should never override a
criminal defendant's right to compulsory process by claiming that
the public "has an interest in a full and truthful disclosure of criti-
cal facts"208 and that the central feature of the discovery rule at
issue in Taylor was "to minimize the risk that fabricated testimony
will be believed."20 9 At one juncture in Taylor the majority opinion
stresses that the trial court has a "vital interest in protecting the
trial process from the pollution of perjured testimony."21
Of course, this reasoning is at variance with the principal teach-
ing of Washington. When the Washington Court invalidated the
Texas competence statute disqualifying accomplices from testify-
ing for one another, it unmistakably rejected the logic behind the
rule. The underlying basis of the statute was to shield the jury
from hearing potentially perjured testimony. The Washington
Court repudiated such a rationale; in essence, it deemed the court's
interest in preventing perjury as subordinate to defendant's right
to compulsory process.2 1' Moreover, this fundamental axiom was
206. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 654.
209. Id. at 655.
210. Id. at 656-57.
211. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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applied to the prosecution in Hoffa v. United States.2" 2
Admittedly, one may raise the objection that the testimony
barred in Washington bore a certain indicia of reliability because
it was consistent with the defendant's testimony that the code-
fendant had fired the fatal shot that killed the victim.213 On the
other hand, Wormley's testimony in Taylor was regarded as "sus-
pect" because he was identified by the defense at the "eleventh
hour." 4 However, if one examines the testimony of Wormley, it
does not seem as tainted as the Taylor Court implies.
Wormley testified that he saw the victim and his brother with
guns wrapped in a blanket prior to the altercation. 1 5 In response
to cross-examination by the prosecutor, Wormley admitted that he
had met Taylor four months before the trial, or over two years af-
ter the shooting occurred. Wormley also acknowledged during
cross-examination that defense counsel had visited him the week
before the trial began.216
Given this testimony, the likelihood that Wormley's testimony
was not reliable or was "polluted" by perjury is negligible. If
Wormley wanted to help Taylor by lying, he would not have ad-
mitted during cross-examination that he had not witnessed the
shooting. Nor, for that matter, is it likely that Wormley would
have acknowledged that he had formally known Taylor for four
months and that defense counsel had visited him before the trial.
Further, if Wormley would have been properly coached by defense
counsel, perhaps he would have verified the sisters' account who
testified on Taylor's behalf at trial. Finally, Wormley appears to
have had little incentive to lie for Taylor, since they had known
each other for a relatively short period of time. The bonds of
friendship did not seem to have solidified to the point of giving
Wormley a strong inducement to lie in Taylor's behalf.
Indeed, it is anomalous that the Taylor majority adopted the
trial court's reasoning that "witnesses are being found that weren't
there" to uphold the court's exclusion of Wormley's testimony.2 17
In fact, Wormley admitted that "he wasn't there." Nevertheless,
his testimony was critical to the defense.
In fact, the crucial issue the Taylor majority chose to ignore was
212. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
214. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655.
215. Id. at 650.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 657.
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the critical nature of Wormley's testimony for Taylor's defense. As
Justice Brennan aptly pointed out in dissent, the jury that con-
victed Taylor was "not permitted to hear evidence that would have
both have placed a gun in Bridges' brother hands and contradicted
the testimony of Bridges and his brother that they possessed no
weapons that evening.11 1 8 This testimony did not threaten the "in-
tegrity" of the criminal justice system, as the majority maintains.
Furthermore, Wormley's testimony was not cumulative or dupli-
cative of the testimony of the other two defense witnesses. In ef-
fect, Wormley's testimony added a crucial ingredient to Taylor's
defense: it established that the victim might have been armed.
Moreover, the testimony was bolstered by the fact that Wormley
was, by all indications, a relatively disinterested party. As the Tay-
lor Court observed, the sisters who testified on Taylor's behalf
were the defendant's "friends." 19 On the other hand, Wormley
could hardly be classified as Taylor's "friend" because they had
met a mere four months before the trial. Thus, Wormley's testi-
mony would have corroborated the sisters' version of the incident
and served to exculpate Taylor.
Even if the stringent criterion applied in Valenzuela-Bernal was
employed by the Taylor Court, Wormley's testimony would not
have been excluded. Of course, in Valenzuela-Bernal the Court
stated that for the defendant to make a prima facie showing of a
violation of compulsory process, she must establish the evidence
was material and favorable to the defense.220 As the preceding dis-
cussion and analysis clearly indicates, the testimony excluded in
Taylor was material and favorable to the defense.
Wormley's testimony, moreover, suffered from no infirmity that
would have warranted its exclusion under evidentiary rules. It is
baffling that the Taylor Court, in rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that the sixth amendment absolutely bars the exclusion of a
defense witness' testimony, raised the objection that a criminal de-
fendant "does not have the unfettered right to offer testimony that
is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under stan-
dard rules of evidence." '21 As previously mentioned, however, the
testimony excluded in Taylor did not suffer from any of those defi-
ciencies. 2 Rather, the only reason Wormley's testimony was ex-
218. Id. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 649.
220. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
221. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 653.
222. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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cluded was for the violation of the Illinois reciprocal discovery rule.
As a result of the trial court's exclusion of Wormley's testimony,
Taylor was prevented from presenting a "complete" defense. One
may contrast the Taylor ruling, therefore, with the Court's holding
in Crane v. Kentucky that the right to present a defense is supe-
rior to state evidentiary and procedural rules when such rules ex-
clude competent, reliable evidence that supports a criminal de-
fendant's claim of innocence.223
The Taylor majority upheld the trial court's exclusion of Worm-
ley's vital testimony by rejecting Taylor's contentions that the
Compulsory Process Clause absolutely precludes the exclusion of
defense evidence as a sanction for the violation of a discovery rule;
and that even conceding the lack of an absolute preclusion of de-
fense evidence, the exclusion of Wormley's testimony was inconsis-
tent with the right to compulsory process.224
It is possible to argue, as Professor Westen has ably done, that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to introduce any ma-
terial evidence, regardless of whether or not it is protected by an
evidentiary privelege.22 5 As Professor White reminds us, however,
such an approach might not be "pragmatic" in light of the current
make-up of the Supreme Court.226 Nonetheless, the defendant's
second argument, that is, that given the specific facts of Taylor the
preclusion of Wormley's testimony was constitutionally impermis-
sible, is well-founded. It is worthwhile, therefore, to explore further
the justifications for such an argument.
The underlying rationale of Taylor's argument that the preclu-
sion sanction was unnecessary in the context of his case rests on
the commonsense notion that less drastic alternatives than exclu-
sion were available to the trial court. Indeed, the majority readily
acknowledged that Taylor was correct in making such an assump-
tion.227 The Court recognized that such alternative sanctions as a
continuance, declaration of a mistrial, or disciplinary sanctions
against defense counsel could have minimized any harm to the
223. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
224. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 651.
225. See Westen, supra note 20, at 161-77. See also United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d
239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981). The court in Davis held that "the Compulsory Process Clause of
the sixth amendment forbids the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence solely as a sanc-
tion to enforce discovery rules or orders against defendants." Id. at 243.
226. White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right to In-
troduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 385-86 (1989).
227. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 654.
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prosecution.22 In effect, the prosecution suffered little harm in
Taylor because it was given the opportunity of cross-examining
Wormley. In fact, the prosecution was able to discover more evi-
dence than it would have under the discovery rule Taylor's counsel
violated.2 9 Under that rule, all the prosecution was entitled to dis-
cover before trial was the name of defense witnesses and any "rele-
vant written or recorded statements." Admittedly, the prosecution
may have been "surprised" by the defense's "eleventh-hour" wit-
ness, but any disadvantage the state may have endured was re-
dressed when it was given the chance of cross-examining Wormley
outside of the jury's presence.
Although the Taylor majority could not seriously rely on the ar-
gument that the prosecution suffered prejudice when Wormley was
produced the second day of trial, it resorted again to its primary
rationale: that the integrity of the adversary process required the
drastic sanction of exclusion to prevent potentially perjured or un-
reliable evidence from tainting the outcome of the trial.23 ° Of
course, as the preceding discussion has demonstrated, such a ra-
tionale is totally without foundation.
The proper solution to the trial court's problem in Taylor is sug-
gested by the Court's discussion of the remedies available to cure
unfair surprise to the prosecution in Williams v. Florida.23' In that
case the Court suggested the remedy of a continuance to negate
the strategic advantage sought by the defense when it failed to re-
veal an alibi witness prior to trial. 232 In this connection, moreover,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi has devised a solution that the
trial court in Taylor could have profitably employed.
In Houston v. State, 3 the Mississippi Supreme Court discussed
a procedure it has developed that reconciles the conflicting goals of
the utilization of relevant, admissible evidence and the imperative
of fairness to the party surprised by the late production of evi-
dence or witnesses.2 34 The standard summarized and applied in
Houston directs the trial court to use a three-step procedure when
confronted with any discovery violation. The procedure entails the
following process: 1) upon objection by a party, the aggrieved party
228. Id. at 654-55.
229. See note 171 for the text of the rule.
230. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 654-55.
231. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
232. Id.
233. 531 So.2d 598 (Miss. 1988).
234. Id. at 611.
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should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to become familiar
with the undisclosed evidence; 2) if after this opportunity is of-
fered, the objecting party still believes that it might suffer
prejudice, it must request a continuance (failure to do so consti-
tutes a waiver of the party's objection to the evidence); and 3) if
the objecting party requests a continuance, the discovery violator
may choose to proceed with the trial and forgo the use of the un-
disclosed evidence (if, however, the discovery violator is not willing
to proceed without the evidence, the court must grant the re-
quested continuance).
2 3 5
Before the Taylor decision was rendered by the Court, in fact,
most state courts had followed the "less drastic" means approach
in dealing with discovery violations.236 Furthermore, as Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Taylor makes clear, the discovery rule at
issue in Taylor was merely a general reciprocal discovery rule and
did not involve the dangers normally associated with alibi defenses
that notice-of-alibi rules are designed to prevent. 37 As Justice
Brennan aptly put it in dissent, the harsh sanction of preclusion
imposed by the trial court and ratified by the majority of the Court
in Taylor, "distorts the truthseeking process by excluding material
evidence of innocence in a criminal case."23 Furthermore, alterna-
tive sanctions "are not only adequate to correct and deter discov-
ery violations but are far superior to the arbitrary and dispropor-
tionate penalty imposed by the preclusion sanction." ' 9
Finally, the majority opinion seems to find support for its hold-
235. Id. at 611-12. It is ironic that while the Houston case, decided after Taylor,
reserves the exclusion sanction for extreme cases, it cites Taylor for the incorrect proposi-
tion that the sanction should ought to be applied only in cases in which the defendant
(emphasis added) participates in some "cynical scheme to gain a substantial tactical advan-
tage." Id. at 612. In Taylor, no evidence existed that the defendant participated in the deci-
sion to conceal Wormley's identity. See infra Part III C.4.
236. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.5 (1985).
237. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 667-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined
the dissent on the condition that it was confined to general reciprocal discovery rules and
did not take a position with regard to sanctions for noncompliance with notice-of-alibi rules.
Id. See also in this respect, Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1190 n.19 (9th Cir. 1983)
(distinguishing in its analysis general discovery rules from the federal notice-of-alibi rule,
"which is a rule designed to deal with particular types of evidence").
238. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
239. Id. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on Rock v. Arkansas 483
U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987), for the proposition that the right to offer defense evidence can only be
limited to the degree such limitations serve "legitimate interests in the criminal trial pro-
cess" and are not "arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."
Id. at 660-61 (citations omitted). See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of this standard enunciated in Rock.
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ing in the "efficiency" rationale by noting that the state's interest
in an "orderly conduct of a criminal trial" warrants the invocation
of "firm" rules regarding the presentation of evidence.2"" It is in-
deed perplexing that the Court values administrative efficiency to
the extent of sacrificing a criminal defendant's right to present rel-
evant, probative exculpatory evidence. This emphasis on "effi-
ciency" and administrative concerns marks a disturbing trend by
the Court in which it resorts to this reasoning to deny criminal
defendants vital sixth amendment rights.
2"
In sum, the Taylor Court's misguided emphasis on reliability
and integrity to sustain the exclusion of materially, relevant evi-
dence resulted in a "distortion" of the truth and the concomitant
misapplication and denigration of the principal dictate of Wash-
ington v. Texas. The majority opinion, moreover, slighted the key
corollaries of Washington's mandate.
3. Is a Jury "Intelligent" Enough to Weigh Credibility?
One of the maxims the Washington opinion embodied is the
right of a criminal defendant to present exculpatory, relevant evi-
dence to a jury despite the possibility that such evidence might be
perjured or otherwise unreliable.242 The Court thereby renounced
the assumptions of the common law rule that only disinterested
parties should be permitted to testify because the "intelligence of
jurors" could not be trusted.4 3 As Justice Brennan's dissent inci-
sively asserts, by allowing the exclusion of Wormley's testimony
because it was "presumably" unworthy of belief, the Taylor Court
"usurped" the jury's chief function in our adversary system: to
weigh the credibility of witnesses.""' Of course, such an arrogation
of the jury's function also contradicts the teachings of Rock v. Ar-
kansas, as well as Washington v. Texas, that rules which preclude
a jury from hearing testimony because of its "presumptive unrelia-
bility" are constitutionally suspect. 245 .
240. Id. at 653.
241. The Court employed this rationale in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
See Garcia, supra note 102, at 420 for a discussion of Marsh's implications. Furthermore,
the Valenzuela-Bernal Court also employed this reasoning to bolster its holding. See supra
notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
243. Washington, 388 U.S. at 21 (quoting from Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325,
336 (1892)). See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
244. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 663, n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




In our adversary system of adjudication, of course, the benefits
of cross-examination serve as a bulwark to ferret out false or unre-
liable testimony. Therefore, in Taylor, had the trial court permit-
ted Wormley's testimony, the prosecutor could have effectively
brought out any inconsistencies and discovered the "real" story
during cross-examination. In fact, the prosecutor accomplished this
task when he cross-examined Wormley outside of the jury's pres-
ence. 246 Instead, the jury's "intelligence" was called into question
when the trial judge deprived it of the right to hear and assess the
weight and credibility of Wormley's testimony. 41
4. A Priori Categories and Compulsory Process
Closely connected with the principle that the jury ought to de-
termine the credibility of relevant, probative, and otherwise admis-
sible evidence is Washington's holding that evidentiary rules
designed to curtail perjury by precluding defense witnesses from
testifying violate the Compulsory Process Clause.24 Of course,
those rules are based on the notion that certain categories of de-
fense witnesses are presumptively not worthy of belief.24 9 In effect,
as Justice Brennan argues, the majority in Taylor ratified the con-
cept repudiated in Washington by implying that a defense witness
who is not identified until the trial has begun is presumptively un-
worthy of belief and thus should be barred from testifying.25 °
Futhermore, the majority's exclusion of Wormley's testimony in
Taylor contravenes the dictates of Chambers and Rock, which
sanctioned the introduction of reliable hearsay statements as well
as a defendant's post-hypnosis testimony despite evidentiary rules
to the contrary.25' The proper course the trial court should have
followed in Taylor would have been to admit Wormley's testimony
but to have permitted the prosecutor to comment on the defense's
late disclosure of Wormley. 52 Rather than pursuing this sensible
246. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
247. According to Justice Brennan's dissent, the trial judge in Taylor did not exclude
Wormley's testimony solely on its apparent lack of credibility because Illinois law forbade
exclusion of testimony based on lack of credibility. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 662 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). On a reading of the appellate record, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the trial court excluded the testimony because of defense counsel's misrepresen-
tation to the court as to when he had located Wormley. Id. at 664.
248. Washington, 388 U.S. at 22.
249. Id.
250. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251. Id.
252. Id. The defendant conceded this point on appeal. Id.
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approach to the problem, however, the trial court indulged in the
presumption of unbelief that Washington and its progeny repudi-
ated. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court endorsed the trial court's
arbitrary preclusion of Wormley's testimony.
5. Visit the Sins of the Lawyer on the Client?
An intriguing part of the Taylor decision is the majority's rejec-
tion of Taylor's contention that his constitutional right to compul-
sory process should not be curtailed because of an ethical violation
by his counsel.25 3 The majority's response to this argument is dis-
ingenuous and utterly lacking in logic. In essence, the majority's
argument is that a criminal defendant is bound by the tactical de-
cisions of his attorney because the lawyer must have "full author-
ity to manage the conduct of the trial."'2 54 The efficiency rationale
again rears its ugly head, as the Court maintains that "the adver-
sary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision
required client approval."2 55
As Justice Brennan argued in dissent, this argument presup-
poses that one may categorize defense counsel's conduct in failing
to identify Wormley as "tactical" in nature. An attorney does not
have the freedom of engaging in conduct that "includes miscon-
duct as an option. 2 56 Moreover, the Court's perspective leads to a
conflict of interest between the defendant and counsel. Justice
Brennan observed that defense counsel in Taylor became less than
zealous when the trial judge threatened to expose his actions to the
bar disciplinary commission.257 In a case where a willful discovery
violation by defense counsel occurs, therefore, it is unrealistic to
expect that defense counsel will protect his client's interests when
those interests clash with counsel's professional reputation.5 '
More importantly, the majority's position in this respect signifi-
cantly abridges a criminal defendant's personal constitutional
right to compulsory process and to a complete and effective de-
fense as a sanction for her counsel's violation of a procedural rule
and for her attorney's possible violation of the professional code of
253. Id. at 657.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 666 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 667.
258. Id. As Justice Brennan succinctly put it, "I cannot see how we can expect defense
counsel in this or any other case to act as vigorous advocates for the interests of their clients
when those interests are adverse to their own." Id.
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ethics. If we accept Justice Brennan's conclusion that the trial
court excluded Wormley's crucial testimony to punish defense
counsel for "purposely lying" about when he had located Worm-
ley,259 then the sins of the defense attorney were visited upon the
defendant. The upshot of this decision was that Taylor's personal
constitutional rights were sacrificed as an atonement for his attor-
ney's allegedly "ethical" violation.
Given the notion advanced by the Court that constitutional
rights are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted,26 it is ironic
indeed that the Taylor Court is willing to circumscribe a vital con-
stitutional trial right of a criminal defendant in part to sanction
defense counsel for a procedural or ethical violation. Indeed, as
Justice Brennan remarks, such alternatives as the imposition of
fines, or the threat of incarceration or disciplinary proceedings, are
far more effective in deterring attorney misconduct than the exclu-
sionary remedy.
261
In fact, the dissent in Taylor could have marshalled another ef-
fective argument to counter the majority's approval of the exclu-
sionary sanction for defense counsel's discovery violation. The
Court in United States v. Leon26 2 gave its approval to the "good-
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.2"' The majority's ration-
ale centered on the assumption that a police officer who secured a
search warrant in "good faith" reliance of its validity would not be
deterred by the exclusionary sanction. The same argument could
be applied to Taylor. That is, why should the defendant be penal-
ized by the exclusionary sanction from presenting critical, proba-
tive exculpatory evidence when he acts in good-faith reliance on
his counsel's representation? Further, if one accepts Leon's ration-
ale, why impose the exclusionary remedy when the likelihood of
deterrence is minimal, if not illusory?
Furthermore, the Court recently held in Arizona v. Young-
blood2 6 4 that the good-faith rationale should apply when the gov-
ernment loses or destroys potentially useful evidence in good faith.
In fact, the interesting aspect of Youngblood is that the Court em-
259. Id. at 664.
260. This, of course, is the concept of "standing" to assert a constitutional violation.
See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing explained as it relates to the fourth
amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (standing concept employed as to
fourth amendment applied by analogy to the sixth amendment).
261. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 665 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
263. Id. at 921.
264. 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), reh'g denied, 109 S.Ct. 885 (1988).
Vol. 28:619
The Compulsory Process Clause
ploys Valenzuela-Bernal to bolster its holding that "unless a crim-
inal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial
of Due Process of law."2 65 The Court clearly proposes a double-
standard in which good-faith may be asserted by the prosecution
to rebut a due-process claim by the defendant, but the defendant
may not reciprocate by resorting to a good-faith argument in at-
tempting to preserve a vital trial-related constitutional right.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, therefore, is not only more
consistent with precedent but also is grounded on a strong logical
foundation. His position, briefly stated, is that if the defendant
does not participate in the discovery violation, the exclusionary
sanction is "arbitrary and disproportionate to the purposes of
discovery, and criminal justice and should be per se
unconstitutional."
26 6
6. Taylor and the Criminal Justice System:
An Assessment
The majority opinion in Taylor has distressing implications for
criminal defendants as well as for the criminal process in general.
It seems that the Court is willing to apply severe sanctions to the
defense but is not as receptive to the idea as far as the prosecution
is concerned. The Court's "misgivings" about the application of
the exclusionary rule to prevent the prosecution from introducing
otherwise admissible, probative evidence did not concern the ma-
jority in Taylor.267 More important, the Court's application of the
exclusionary rule in Taylor alters the balance of power in a crimi-
nal trial by in effect facilitating the prosecution's task in obtaining
a conviction.
The prosecution's advantage in Taylor may be readily discerned
by examining the dynamics of the case and, in particular, the effect
of the discovery rule at issue in the case. One may readily conclude
that the discovery rule Taylor's counsel contravened clearly fa-
vored the prosecution. This proposition is supported by Justice
265. Id. at 337.
266. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 658, 667.
267. Justice Brennan did notice this irony by stating in his dissenting opinion that "It
seems particularly ironic that the Court should approve the exclusion of evidence in this
case when several of its members have expressed serious misgivings about the evidentiary
costs of exclusionary rules in other contexts." Id. at 667. See Part IV infra for an elabora-
tion of this argument.
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Douglas' prescient concurring opinion in Wardius v. Oregon.26 In
that opinion, Justice Douglas maintained that the guarantees ac-
corded criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights do not contem-
plate an "adversary proceeding between two equal parties."2"9
Rather, these rights are designed to rectify the prosecution's enor-
mous advantage in terms of investigation and other resourses vis-
a-vis the criminal defendant.270
Viewed from this perpective, the reciprocal discovery rule at is-
sue in Taylor271 does not seem as neutral as it appears at first
glance. By allowing the prosecution to discover the names and ad-
dresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial and any
statements made by the witnesses, the rule gives the government
an insight into the defense's case. Therefore, the prosecution not
only enjoys its inherent investigative advantage over the defendant
but also gets a glimpse of the defendant's possible strategy at trial.
Further, the reciprocal discovery rule in Taylor was not intended
to prevent the last-minute fabricated testimony that notice-of-alibi
rules supposedly guard against.
The exclusion of Wormley's testimony, moreover, diminished the
prosecution's burden to establish Taylor's guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. In re Winship272 establishes the prosecution's burden of
proof and delineates the fundamental tenet that our criminal ad-
versary process prefers a wrongful acquittal over a mistaken con-
viction.2 73 Furthermore, in Cool v. United States274 the Court in-
validated an instruction to the effect that an accomplice's
testimony should be disregarded unless the jury believed that it
was true beyond a reasonable doubt because the instruction re-
duced the government's burden of proof.275 The Court in Cool
reached this conclusion on the ground that the instruction created
"an artificial barrier" to the weighing by the jury of relevant, mate-
rial exculpatory evidence.276
268. 412 U.S. 470, 480 (Douglas, J., concurring). See supra notes 129-31 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Douglas' opinion.
269. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 480 (Douglas, J. concurring).
270. Id.
271. See supra note 171 for the text of the rule.
272. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
273. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan stated that: "[T]he require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case. . . [is] bottomed on a funda-
mental value determination in our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free." Id.
274. 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
275. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text for an extended analysis of Cool.
276. Cool, 409 U.S. at 104.
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In Taylor, of course, the jury did not have the opportunity of
hearing Wormley's material, exculpatory evidence linking the al-
leged victim's brother to the gun that injured the victim. This evi-
dence could have created reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds
and therefore led to an acquittal or, possibly, to a hung jury. The
trial court's exclusion of Wormley's testimony, however, precluded
the defendant from planting the seed of doubt in the jury's mind
and thereby facilitated the prosecution's burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Taylor decision represents the crowning triumph of the
"sporting theory" of justice. The ruling exalts procedure over sub-
stance to unparalleled heights. The Court engages in "doubles-
peak" when it quotes United States v. Nixon for the proposition
that the ends of justice are ill-served if "judgments were to be
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.
'271 7
By denying the defendant the right to present a "complete" de-
fense, the Taylor Court permitted his conviction to rest on an in-
complete presentation of the facts. In an effort to rigidly preserve
the "sanctity of discovery, ' 17 8 the Court upheld Taylor's conviction
"in the interest of fair play. '279 The Court's attempt to achieve
"fairness" in the criminal justice process produced an eminently
"unjust" result for Ray Taylor and for the criminal justice system.
IV. INTEGRITY, RELIABILITY, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: ARE
THEY REALLY THAT IMPORTANT TO THE SUPREME COURT?
Paradoxically, the Taylor Court's ratification of the exclusionary
remedy in Taylor is at odds with the Court's recent antipathy to-
ward the exclusionary rule. In fact, Justice Brennan expresses this
contradiction in his dissenting opinion in Taylor.28 Justice Bren-
nan's analysis of this dichotomy, however, is rather conclusory.
This section, therefore, will elaborate upon the dissent's exposition
of this contradiction in light of the Court's devaluation of the ex-
clusionary remedy as applied to the prosecution and will examine
the enigmatic stress on integrity and reliability by the Taylor
Court in light of the Court's recent depreciation of those values.
277. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 652 (quoting from United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974)).
278. This is the apt phrase used by Justice Brennan in his dissent. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at
667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
279. This language is taken from Pound's address to the A.B.A. See, supra Part I,
note 3.
280. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A. The Exclusionary Rule and Taylor
The Supreme Court's hostility toward the effects of the exclu-
sionary remedy reached its apogee in United States v. Leon.
28 1
Leon was previously analyzed in the context of its relationship to
the Taylor Court's imposition of the exclusionary remedy as a
sanction for defense counsel's discovery violation.282 It is necessary
to revisit Leon, however, in order to apply it in a broader context.
Of course, in Leon the Court fashioned the "good-faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule. In broad terms, Leon stands for the pro-
position that in circumstances wherein police officers obtain a
search warrant in "good faith" and the warrant is subsequently in-
validated because it was issued without probable cause, the exclu-
sionary rule will not be applied.28 3 The policy rationale of the ma-
jority centered on the argument that the cost of suppressing such
evidence far outweighed its benefits, since the deterrence objective
underlying the exclusionary remedy would not be served when po-
lice officers obtain a warrant in the objectively reasonable "good
faith" belief that is valid.
If the Taylor Court would have adhered to the reasoning upon
which Leon is grounded, it would not have suppressed Wormley's
testimony. Weighing the "costs" and "benefits" of exclusion in
Taylor yields the unequivocal conclusion that the costs of exclud-
ing Wormley's testimony superseded the benefits derived from
suppression. The costs of suppression were substantial: the exclu-
sion of material, relevant evidence that exculpated the defendant
and that might have swayed the jury by creating reasonable doubt.
By contrast, the benefits of excluding Wormley's testimony pale in
comparison with the costs. If the Court was seeking general deter-
rence of future discovery violations by defense counsel, it is un-
likely that the suppression of Wormley's testimony had its desired
effect. Defense counsel did not suffer any punitive sanctions for
the violation; rather, Taylor paid the "costs" of his counsel's trans-
gression through the exclusion of Wormley's testimony.
If the Taylor Court's concern with the integrity of the criminal
process and the reliability of testimony is the focus of its decision,
as this Article maintains, the benefits again fall short of the costs
exacted by exclusion. Quite simply, the primary cost of suppression
281. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The companion case to Leon is Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981 (1984).
282. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
283. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21.
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was significant: the jury that convicted Taylor was barred from
hearing testimony that would have had an effect on the determina-
tion of guilt. The worst case scenario of this suppression is that,
because of the delay in discovery, "an innocent man may be serv-
ing ten years in prison. "284 The benefits, on the other hand, are
minimal at best, nonexistent at worst. Apart from the Court's
deviation from precedent, even if it believed that trial court was
correct in keeping perjured or presumptively perjured testimony
from the jury, the net effect of its ruling was to insult the intelli-
gence of the jurors, who had the option of rejecting Wormley's
testimony.
B. Integrity, the Exclusionary Rule, and Taylor
Not only is the Taylor Court's deprecation of its own doctrine
regarding the exclusionary rule contradictory, but it also is rather
baffling that the key reasoning of Taylor rests on the integrity ra-
tionale. Indeed, the Court weighs the right of the defendant to
compulsory process against the "integrity of the adversary process"
and finds that integrity is more important than compulsory pro-
cess.285 By contrast, the Court has abandoned integrity as a ration-
ale for the exclusionary rule.
As previously mentioned,2 86 the principal objective of the exclu-
sionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct. However, another
compelling rationale of the exclusionary rule is "the imperative of
judicial integrity. 28 7 Of course, the "imperative of judicial integ-
rity" is predicated on the notion that courts condone the violation
of the Constitution by admitting evidence that is tainted because it
was illegally obtained. The erosion of the integrity rationale as
support for the exclusionary rule, however, is unmistakable. It be-
gan with United States v. Calandra28 s and has continued un-
abated, to the point that the Court has completely dispensed with
integrity as a basis for the rule.
28
1
284. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 655.
286. See part I supra.
287. This rationale was first expressed by the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960).
288. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (the majority focused solely on the deterrence rationale in
holding that a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions because they are based
on illegally seized evidence).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). For an argument that the
principal goal of the exclusionary rule is to maintain judicial integrity rather than to deter
police illegality, see, e.g., Baldwin, Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and
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In light of this eradication of the integrity rationale as a basis for
the exclusionary rule, it is ironic that the Taylor decision relies so
heavily on integrity to exclude the testimony of a witness who was
willing to offer material, relevant evidence helpful to the defend-
ant. One can only explain this manifest inconsistency by assuming
that integrity is important to the Court when it adversely affects
the defendant but is irrelevant when integrity might detract from
the government's ability to secure a conviction.
C. Reliability, Connelly, and Taylor
The integrity of the adversary system, the majority in Taylor
insists, "depends . . on the presentation of reliable evidence and
the rejection of unreliable evidence."28 0 What is truly remarkable
about this statement is that the Court in Colorado v. Connelly
291
rejected out of. hand the notion that reliability was worthy of con-
stitutional concern or protection under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.292 The Connelly Court held that, ab-
sent coercion by the police, the confession of an insane defendant
is "voluntary" and hence admissible into evidence and does not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.293
More important, the Connelly Court emphasized the considera-
ble costs exacted by the exclusionary rule and cited the deterrence
rationale as the sole basis for the rule. 94 It is instructive, more-
over, to juxtapose the Connelly Court's statement that it had "pre-
viously cautioned against expanding 'currently applicable exclu-
sionary rules by erecting additional barriers to placing truthful and
probative evidence before state juries,"2 95 with the Taylor decision.
The "truthful and probative" evidence the Court in Connelly
declared constitutionally admissible into evidence was the confes-
sion of a defendant who suffered from chronic schizophrenia at the
time he confessed. 296 The Connelly Court readily acknowledged
that such a confession might be less than "reliable." Nonetheless,
although the Court recognized that Connelly's confession might
"be proved to be quite unreliable," it deemed such an issue not
Justification, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 505 (1987).
290. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655.
291. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
292. Id. at 167. For a critique of this position see Garcia, supra note 18, at 280-81.
293. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
294. Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
295. Id. (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972)).
296. Id. at 161-62.
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worthy of constitutional concern and best left to "the evidentiary
laws of the forum." 9 Indeed, the Court went as far as to declare
that, "[t]he aim of the requirement of Due Process is not to ex-
clude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.
298
A comparison of the evidence suppressed because of its putative
"unreliability" in Taylor and the confession the Court in Connelly
did not view as constitutionally suspect yields only one conclusion:
reliability is important for the Court as far as the defendant is con-
cerned but is of no consequence with regard to the prosecution.
Wormley's testimony was that of a sane, competent individual who
was subject to cross-examination by the government. Although one
might argue that Wormley's testimony was tainted by its "elev-
enth-hour" nature, it surely bore as much, if not more, indicia of
reliability as Connelly's confession. In effect, the Court seems to be
comfortable with a double-standard that favors the government
and curtails a criminal defendant's critical trial-related constitu-
tional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Is our adversary process of adjudication excessively procedural
and therefore "blind" to justice, as Pound argued in his landmark
address to the American Bar Association over eight decades ago?
The Supreme Court seems to agree with Pound's assessment of our
adjudicatory system, at least insofar as it affects the criminal pro-
cess and, particularly, to the degree it suppresses material, relevant
evidence sought to be introduced by the prosecution at trial.
In Taylor v. Illinois, however, the Court subscribed to the
"sporting theory" of justice with a vengeance. In the name of "pro-
cedural" consistency, the Taylor Court excluded relevant, proba-
tive, otherwise admissible exculpatory evidence that could have al-
tered the course of the trial. In the process of doing so, the Court
deprived the defendant of a vital constitutional right deeply em-
bedded in our jurisprudence: the right of the defendant to compul-
sory process for obtaining and presenting witnesses in her favor.
It is a sad commentary on the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court that a state supreme court has shed more wisdom on the
issue of the extent to which discovery rules should interfere with a
defendant's right to compulsory process than the Taylor Court's
297. Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
298. Id (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)).
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flawed analysis of the matter. In Houston v. State,29 9 the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court eloquently described the function of a crimi-
nal trial as a "trial for life and liberty [and] not a game."300 The
court put discovery rules in perspective by classifying them as "not
an end in themselves but a means to the end that we dare call
justice." 30 1 More important, the court adhered to the principle first
enunciated in Washington v. Texas, °2 that procedural and, specif-
ically, discovery rules ought to be applied with a view toward the
fact-finder, whether judge or jury, receiving all "relevant and oth-
erwise admissible" evidence. 303
The decision of the Court in Taylor represents the ultimate glo-
rification of the "sporting theory" which a majority of the Court
has decried on many occasions. Procedural rigidity, however,
seemed to suit the purposes of the Taylor Court because the ag-
grieved party was the defendant, not the government. In essence,
the Taylor Court "evened" the score by reversing the trend begun
in Washington that stressed substantive justice and eschewed
strict procedural conformity.
299. 531 So.2d 598 ( Miss. 1988).
300. Id. at 611.
301. Id.
302. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
303. Houston, 531 So.2d at 611.
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